Dapchi: There should have been precautionary and response mechanisms

It is nearly two weeks since the notorious Boko Haram insurgents struck in Dapchi in Yobe State and kidnapped 110 schoolgirls. No one is sure how long it will take before the girls are brought back home, like some of those previously taken. Nor does anyone know at what price their release from the abductors’ dungeon will be negotiated. But what is certain is the criminals that seized them from their school have a motive (and, possibly, many motives), which is to frustrate education. And the girl-child education has been a major victim.

The Boko Haram insurgents abhor education and one of the ways they actualise their hate for western education is through attacks on schools. After each invasion they leave behind a trail of massive destruction and sorrow. And no school or community in the north-east of Nigeria has been exempt from this orgy of cruelty. So, in Buni Yadi, Mamudo, Maiduguri, Damaturu, Chibok, Damasak and, now, Dapchi, among others, has the terror group’s signature been ingrained in the memory of their victims and many Nigerians.

The Dapchi disaster is quite traumatising because it happened soon after the government declared victory over Boko Haram and its leader Abubakar Shekarau appeared in a short video in which he seemed dampened, although characteristically adamant. His opposite number in the group’s breakaway faction, Abu Mus’ab Al-barnawi is, according to some reports, in the custody of the government, suggesting that the insurgents have been effectively restrained but for intermittent suicide bombings.

Some analyst had, however, dismissed the government declaration of victory as premature given the continued ability of the insurgents to carry out some attacks with precision. But the government dismissed these fears, arguing that an insurgency, normally, takes time to be fully stamped out. This argument makes sense if one considers other parts of the world where similar violence have continued, although at a curtailed level, for several years after such declarations.

But some happenings, regardless of the plausibility of the government point, suggest that the war was far from over, even before Dapchi happened.

It is important to consider the continued elusiveness of Abubakar Shekau as a huge shortcoming, despite several claims about his death and the recent order by the Army Chief of Staff Tukur Buratai to his men to capture him dead or alive. The deadline for the order to be executed has since elapsed, but there is still no Shekau or his head.

Shekau, a man of a hard heart, has continued to negotiate through intermediaries with the government. These negotiations, although resulted in the release of some of the abductees, have also earned Shekau and his group valuable concessions. And this is what he needs in order to avoid capture and keep the insurgency alive.

The success of Shekau’s group in these negotiations has, indirectly, inspired the Al-barnawi faction, if it is true that it is responsible for the Dapchi abduction, to venture into the flourishing world of kidnap for ransom. Kidnap for ransom is a major means of sustenance for terrorist and organised criminal groups. High profile abductees are usually a big target. And from these category of abductees millions are extorted to fund the criminal activities.

Shekau’s Boko Haram was quick to take advantage of the global outrage that followed the Chibok schoolgirls’ abduction and attach a high profile label to the girls. This decision has paid off and earned the group a lot more than the $3 million dollars it got from the French Family of seven it abducted in February 2013. And, more importantly, it has kept the cash flow steady.

While the government had a tough choice between negotiation to get the girls back alive, after conceding to the group’s demands, and refusing to negotiate with the terrorists and risk losing the girls, a more moderate position should have been taken. Paying huge ransoms in addition to releasing terrorists in government’s custody has, certainly, been anything but moderate. And this is why the group and other factions would keep coming back for more girls in the hope of always having their way on a negotiating table. This is another big shortcoming of the fight against the insurgents.

One aspect of the fight, a fundamental shortcoming, about which the government has been mum is the allegation that the soldiers in Sambisa forest were just moments from capturing Abubakar Shekau when an order came that halted the advance. It was in this time that the insurgents launched a counteroffensive, killing some of the soldiers while Shekau, once again, avoided capture. This order, for it to have been obeyed by the soldiers, must have come from a credible source. That source must be known to the soldiers and can, therefore, not be anonymous.

For the government to be taken seriously that it is actually tackling the insurgency as it should and working relentlessly to get back the abductees, the source of the order needs to be traced and appropriate action taken. It is also important that the president should summon security chiefs and ask for explanations for their failure to prevent the attack on the school and the absence of a rapid response during and after the abduction.

Unless actions are taken to reassure Nigerians that the fight is genuine and there’s a total commitment to end the insurgency people would continue to regard declarations that the Boko Haram insurgency has been defeated as mere propaganda. After all, there should have been precautionary and response mechanisms to prevent the repeat of Chibok in Dapchi.

This article is also published in the Blueprint newspaper of Saturday, March 3, 2018.