A nation at war (2)

Aliyu Musa

For reasons earlier outlined, leaving the police out of this for now seems a sensible option, for their and our own good. But can we also forget their Alakyo mishap so easily? Perhaps, it should be probed deeply, aside from the roles allegedly played by moles in the force.

The questions to ask are: how did more than a dozen truckloads of policemen drive straight into booby traps to get decimated without any sign of serious resistance or fight back? Why was there was no plan to provide cover and back up for the first batch? How was it that all the time it happened no reinforcement was sent and the police simply went quiet?

Not that one expects any answers, but it is worth trying to answer these and other questions to, at least, know how badly we’re doing. But what is more shocking is nothing will come out of any investigation or probe panel except the money that will be spent on over pampered fat cats who run the show all the time. Not even the main culprits will be brought to justice nor will any lesson be learnt to enhance our aptitude to face future similar challenges that are never in short supply.

The bigger danger is if our police are so appallingly unreliable the society is in real trouble. It means there is no law and order. It means people will need to fight back against bullies all by themselves and package their own survival strategies that could mean anything from acquiring illegal weapons to joining dangerous cults. In the end soldiers, who in real sense should have no business policing neighbourhoods in peacetimes, will be called upon all the time to do jobs meant for traditional police.

If, for example, our soldiers defeat the Boko Haram insurgents or scurry them to safer havens, the onus will then fall on the police and paramilitary groups to maintain the situation while soldiers are withdrawn or their numbers significantly reduced to allow for proper post-conflict reconstruction.

But they are clearly incapable, so the best option will be to keep soldiers there – that is if they win the last battles. And by keeping them there at least a stage in post-conflict reconstruction is either skipped or badly managed. In the end civilian settlements are perpetually militarized with several negative consequences.

In places like Jos, where soldiers were kept for ages in civilian neighbourhoods, there were countless complaints of excesses. So, the most significant thing the government needs to do now is to seriously begin resuscitating the police and paramilitary to take over from soldiers if the insurgency is defeated or significantly weakened.

Defeating the insurgency is another matter on its own. The trouble with sub-state conflicts like the one Boko Haram is waging is it can hardly be fully defeated militarily. The first major reason is that the insurgents are not conventional soldiers, are not used to or do not plan on employing conventional war strategies and are very keen to keep to this tactic to maximize their gains.

On the other hand our soldiers are not used to unconventional strategies like the one they face against the Boko Haram fighters. They want to quickly run over the rebels and establish their supremacy, but it does not happen as they plan so they become frustrated and worn out.

Although the military could use their superior firepower, especially aerial strikes, to significantly reduce the lethalness of the insurgents the trouble is it will only result in the insurgents melting back into civilian population or scampering to other places, where they could regroup, strategize and launch a comeback.

In 2009, following the sect’s seeming extermination, survivors reportedly retreated to places like northern Cameroon, Algeria and Mali. They eventually regrouped and it was from there they launched a resurgence of the group in its most violent form.

We risk repeating history unless the strategy is fully reorganized. That is why the insurgents continue to counter claims of military victory with video footages that may only be the usual propaganda. But even NATO forces recognize the infinite relevance of winning the media war.

The biggest possible threat to effusively exorcising the insurgency is, perhaps, the incentives within and around the areas it occurs. Scholars of conflict refer to this threat as the ‘Epidemiological Triangle’, which refers to three main factors that make violent conflicts endure. These are the host, agents and environment.

Postscript

This article appears in the Blueprint newspaper of Friday May 31, 2013.