Egypt’s endorsement of anarchy

Aliyu Musa

In December 1991 Algeria’s coalition of Islamist groups, the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS), constituted such a formidable political force that it clearly dominated the first round of elections in the country and was set to win the second. But authorities, utterly wary of handing over power to an Islamist government, scuttled the democratic process and banned FIS. That was the trigger for a civil insurgency that lasted nearly six years and cost no fewer than 100, 000 lives.

The sack Wednesday of Egypt’s first democratically elected government is monumental enough to joggle one’s memory back to the events of the early 1990s in neighbouring Algeria and associated chain of events. It also leaves one wondering loudly if democracy, as it is widely understood, has any relevance in government in non-Western societies.

In his book The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics Samuel Edward Finer warned that a major deterrent to military intrusion in politics is the incontestable efficiency of elected governments in such a way that economic viability and orderly functioning of the state are guaranteed.

The absence of competent governments, thus, is genuinely or falsely cited in justifying the enthronement of despotic juntas in place of elected civilian governments that are accused of turning autocratic, just like Mohammed Morsi’s deposed regime in Egypt.

When in early 2011 Egyptians came out in millions to reject Hosni Mubarak’s government it was certain it was the end of the road for the regime. It was also justified because the regime was overspent and corrupt. It was, however, not clear whether the military would throw its weight behind the revolution or not. But it did not only back the revolution it – although nudged by renewed protests – also midwifed a brief transition to democracy that culminated in the elections that brought the Muslim Brotherhood to power. And although it then seemed a happy ending latest happenings suggest otherwise.

Morsi’s tragic tumble from Olympus could largely be blamed on four main factors: his own uncharismatic leadership style and misjudegements; an austere economy he inherited; an ever cantankerous and anarchic opposition; and an opportunistic military that never misses the chance to join the bandwagon.

Of all his alleged sins Morsi’s plot to arrogate himself unlimited powers that would allow him arm-twist the legislature and judiciary was the most irritating. More so, it came by means of a decree, showing little or no respect for the country’s constitution and potentially paving the way for the military to fully set aside the constitution and supervise a disgraceful rape of democracy.

Contrastingly, methinks the claim that he failed to properly handle the economy was the least of his crimes, since in fairness to him he inherited a system in near tatters following decades of Mubarak’s tyranny. But, again, he did himself no good by allowing the fracas to blow out of proportion by agreeing to listen to the voices of reason only when it was too late.

In all of this the biggest losers are the people themselves, many of whom have allowed themselves to be blinded by the belief that ousting an elected government through an illegitimate means is a phase in the revolution that kicked out Mubarak. Morsi did become intoxicated with power and completely forgot the circumstance that brought him to office. But refusing to use legitimate means to make him defray the cost was, to say the least, a much bigger sacrilege for which there might be grave consequences.

It will be fully foolhardy to assume the military would see this as a one-off rescue mission and in future confine itself to its traditional role. Let’s not pretend that Morsi did not have his own swarming supporters – gatherings fiercely articulating support for him were seen in various parts of the capital. His supporters are already arguing his sack is a coup against their own wish, as expressed in the elections.

The big issue is whether they would accept his removal as an expression of the wish of the ‘people’ without putting up a fight now or later, as was seen in the case of FIS in Algeria. Even if pro-Morsi voices were cowed a precedent has been set, which would be used as a reference point at some point. If, for instance there were elections in the next couples of months and any of the opposition parties’ candidate won, what chance would the winner have of completing his/her term? Or would he/she be forced to resign or be sacked if there were opposition protests against the government?

The reality is Morsi’s backers, especially the Muslim Brotherhood, cannot be totally muscled out of existence. Democracy, as it were, cannot afford to be so clearly one-sided and flourish. It faces a real threat where the armed forces are unendingly relied on as the only alternative to politicians’ insanity. Once again Egypt has set a record. Let’s hope it’s not self-destruct.