Tackling Boko Haram: Between Jonathan’s attempts, Buhari’s promises and the way forward

Aliyu Musa

(Continued from last week)

Host: Countries in the sub-region are weak states and none is, on its own, immune from the sects’ ideology and violent backlash. Chad, had been crippled from years of crises that were both external (conflict with Libya and the Darfur spill over effect) and internal (rebel insurrections); until 2012 when the ECOWAS and French-led multinational forces intervened Mali was home to several rebel and terrorist groups like the Tuareg MNLA and the al-Qaeda endorsed Ansar Dine; Cameroun’s link with the Maitatsine and Boko Haram sects dates back to many decades, and this, given the dissatisfaction of the north with Paul Biya’s presidency which has effectively alienated them, explains why Cameroun has always provided a safe haven and has the potential to implode if the insurgency continues to gain momentum (a Boko Haram indoctrination cell was very recently discovered in the north of the country and Marwa, Muhammadu Marwa’s hometown, has remained an active incubator); Niger has also been significantly affected by rebel insurrections, initially by Tuareg separatist groups and later the Niger Movement of Justice (MNJ) etc. So, with these and much else it is not a surprise that ideologies like Boko Haram are able to stick around for as long as possible and even spread. Once again, like cancer an appropriate treatment of the disease is the only panacea or it could collapse the entire system. A lesson needs to be learned from the case of the countries in the Great Lakes Region, where Joseph Kony’s Lord Resistance Army’s reign of terror has endured for decades. And because the region is made up of weak states in and around which Kony swiftly navigates, spreading hate ideology, cajoling and/or conscripting young minds to swell his army.

What have our responses been like?

A number of commentators have argued that General Buhari’s success in suppressing the Maitatsine uprising was largely due to the non-sophistication of the sect and that it’s unlikely he’d succeed with Boko Haram. I have studied the APC manifesto and how it says it would respond to the insurgency if elected (that remains to be seen though). We are aware of the PDP response – an unambiguous mismanagement of the crisis since 2009 (or 2002, if we go back to the sect’s first clash with security personnel). In July 2009 the government of the late Umar Musa Yar’Adua ordered the uprising be quelled at all cost and the excesses that followed were untold. And since the sect’s reemergence in 2010 the government of Goodluck Jonathan, at best, allowed the crisis to fester because it believed that those fermenting it were opponents of the regime whose ultimate plan was to embarrass the government (I have already explained how the political class played into this blame game, making is possible for the insurgency to grow from strength to strength). For example, after the disappearance of more than 250 girls from the secondary school in Chibok, which drew global anger, the government continued to be in denial of the matter and even dismissed it as a hoax initiated by Governor of Borno State Kashim Shettima whose intent, again they claimed, was to embarrass the government. Often it took the president hours and sometimes days or weeks to comment after attacks that cost the lives of many citizens. A recent example was on January 7, 2015 when the Baga invasion happened almost simultaneously with another terrorist attack in far-away Paris on the French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo. Without being insensitive we all know that the 12 lives lost in the Paris attack melt into insignificance if compared to the over 2000 that died in Nigeria’s Baga. But President Goodluck Jonathan had within hours sent a condolence message to the French government while clearly ignoring the Baga case. If this is not the height of nonchalance nothing else is. But this act, as irritating as it is, should not shock anyone, considering the president’s track record of indifference. In April 2014, a day after the massacre of nearly 100 Nigerians in bomb attacks in Nyanya Bus Station, Abuja, the president flew to Kano to attend a political jamboree as if nothing had happened. Again, on the day more than 50 schoolchildren killed in bomb attacks in a secondary school in Potsikum, Yobe State were buried – another day National Mourning should have been declared – the president went on to launch his re-election campaign. So, where’s the empathy leaders are normally expected to show in situations like these? In July 2004 Philippines’ President Gloria Arroyo risked frosty relations with the US by withdrawing troops from Iraq to save the life of Philippine hostage Angelo de la Cruz. And very recently King Abdullah of Jordan, after unsuccessfully negotiating with ISIL fighters to secure the release of pilot Moaz al-Kassasbeh, promised ISIL blistering retribution by personally leading airstrikes on them.

I do not believe that General Buhari (if elected) will have an easy answer to the Boko Haram menace. But those who are quick to dismiss his ability to tackle the insurgency need to give him the benefit of the doubt. Leadership succeeds often where there’s a will. In 1984 Buhari did not hide in the comfort of Dodan Barracks in Lagos to order soldiers quelling the Maitatsine uprising in Yola. He flew to Yola to make sure things went well. In tackling Boko Haram he’d certainly need to do a lot more, especially given Boko Haram’s sophistication and spread. Military solution is just one out of many and that’s why I believe the response then was not fail-safe. Imagine what would happen if the military action had swiftly been followed up with a political/economic solution. If after the death of Muhammadu Marwa in 1980 a conscious and purposeful de-radicalisation programme was introduced would remnants of the sect like my friend have continued to radicalise unsuspecting youths across the region? If there were collaborations among countries in the sub-region would those behind the cells in Nigeria, Cameroun, Niger, Mali, Chad and even Mauritania have succeeded in linking up to unleash all this havoc?

Although based on APC’s manifesto alone – in which its says it would improve the capacity of law enforcement agents to safeguard lives and property, establish and fully train and equip a serious counter terrorism squad etc., create state and community police and work with countries in the sub-region, across the continent and world to address economic and security concerns – it does not come out clearly how it intends tackling Boko Haram it could be encouraged to come out with a more precise blueprint. In chapter eight of my forthcoming book ‘Boko Haram insurgency and sub-state conflict contagion in the Sahel region – a framework for conflict analysis and resolution’ I apply Azar’s (1990) collaborative problem-solving approach to devise a framework for applying military and political solutions.

In an interview not long ago General Buhari said his approach would include military and political solutions, although amnesty was out of the question. I agree with him. But I would suggest a collaborative problem-solving approach, which would require some sort of amnesty, not to everyone but to conscripts and child soldiers who demonstrate genuine remorse and willingness to be rehabilitated. Meanwhile, Abubakar Shekau and other senior members are definite candidates for The Hague, where they should be made to face charges of crimes against humanity – that is if they don’t fight to the death. In view of this a framework could be devised to cover although by no means limited to the following:

(1) Military operation – on-going military operations should be allowed to continue so the sect’s ability to carry out any organized attacks can be significantly diminished. In cooperation with the multinational forces there should be emphasis on making sure insurgents are not allowed to melt into the civilian population in Nigeria or any of the countries in the sub-region, as was the case in the past. Nigeria also needs to do an overall appraisal of its response to the insurgency in order to find out why it failed for several years, until much smaller countries like Chad, Niger and Cameroun intervened.

(2) Joint intelligence gathering – this should have been one of the early processes of combating the menace of the sect so as to significantly hamper the success of its campaign of violence across borders. Nigeria needs to convene a meeting of strategic partners from the sub-region to discuss the possibility of sharing intelligence. One factor that particularly favoured the insurgents was the absence of joint intelligence gathering, which clearly demonstrates indifference on the part of the countries that are now affected by the insurgency. This has to change especially now that the sect has openly aligned itself with ISIL. Its sources of funding, which could be from local or foreign sources, could be uncovered and blocked to further cripple it.

(3) Counter terrorism approach – like it has been indicated in APC’s manifesto there should be a well-equipped counter terrorism unit that would be proactive in combating terrorism and forestalling terrorist plans, including suicide bombings. It should work with the intelligence-gathering unit so as to access information as quickly as possible and be able to act on it. The 9/11 experience of the US has forced many countries to introduce this kind of proactive unit that works round the clock to uncover and frustrate terror plans.

(4) Local/community policing – again APC’s plan to introduce state and community policing is in order but care must be taken to ensure that they are not misused. In most advanced countries community police are more effective in combating crimes within communities because they understand the local terrain and people and can easily understand and unravel puzzles and predict possibilities. In the case of Nigeria, a country with collapsing institutions and just passing through a difficult experience with terrorism, community policing would be very useful in uncovering covert terrorist plans. It would be helpful if the current crop of Civilian JTF is given proper training and coopted into this unit to work with the terrorism and intelligence units by passing on information to them. At the minute, even after decimating Boko Haram militarily, more suicide attacks are likely to continue until the sources of this operation are found out and destroyed. On the other hand at the end of the conflict CJTF members would become irrelevant and redundant and unless coopted into a regular security unit they could constitute a significant security risk.

(5) De-radicalisation – a very difficult yet highly essential phase is the attempt to de-radicalise ex-insurgents/terrorists/militants. To be able to do this the expertise of at least four categories of specialists may be needed. These experts could include religious leaders/clerics, community/traditional leaders, security/terrorism experts or scholars, psychologists etc. There may also be a need to involve genuinely repentant former insurgents or people close to them that are able to understand the way their mind works. It’s very helpful if attempts are made to understand the processes of radicalisation they undergo, the literature they read or are read to them (the grey literature they access or are used in radicalising them need to be fully studied and understood). I mentioned a book Yusuf has bequeathed to the sect as a likely literature – this needs to be studied as a starting point. This is important in view of the recent suggestion the chief Imam of Al-Azhar University Sheikh Ahmed al-Tayeb made that a reform of religious (Islamic) teaching was needed. While I don’t agree with him completely I nonetheless think interpretation has been a major issue, which is why both Marwa and Yusuf succeeded in using religious literature to manipulate their audience.

(6) Justice for victims – At the end of the insurgency we would need to talk about bringing perpetrators of crimes against humanity to justice. Like I mentioned earlier some people would certainly go to The Hague if they’re captured alive. Now the question is what would happen to those with smaller crimes like conscripts e.g. Zahara’u Babangida, the 13-year-old female suicide bomber apprehended in Kano? What would happen to other conscripts who might decide to surrender now or at a later point, who ordinarily would have long surrendered but for fear of retribution from Shekau? What would happen to children that are radicalised and used by the sect? I suggest, in addition to de-radicalisation or as a deal to enable them to support the de-radicalisation process these category of insurgents should be given lighter sentences and be confined to places where they would be rehabilitated and certified fit before being released back into the larger society. Another big question is what to do with those indicted of crimes against humanity on the side of the government. Justice needs to be seen to be done by also prosecuting them. But this would depend on the weight of evidence against them and the readiness of the government to sacrifice them. Also, would there be compensation for victims with genuine grievances like those inappropriately punished or who lost family members or property or a source of livelihood? What would happen to the families of missing girls? Would the Nigerian government work with neighbouring countries’ governments to look for them? What if they are not found, how would the families be comforted or compensated?

(7) Economic/social solution – one big issue is whether there would be economic and social policies to address the factors that breed such radical ideas as Maitatsine and Boko Haram in the first place like rampant and crippling poverty, inequality, and injustice. Policies to address the increasing emergence of slums need to be introduced to reduce the gap between the rich and the poor. Purposeful, creative and transformative education to prepare people for the challenges of life needs to be considered. Collapsing institutions need to be revamped. There should be full-scale post-conflict reconstruction, which would require help from outside –perhaps through the AU and international funding bodies. These sources of funding should be explored immediately to know how much help might be received. In line with this plan efforts should be made to tap from Nigeria’s abundant manpower resources especially outside of the country and continent. The country could draw from its massive Diaspora population across the world.

(8) Healing process – at the end of every conflict there’s a point where a full reflection takes place, looking back at what went wrong, who got wronged and what could be done to heal the wounds inflicted and prevent a recurrence. Victims and perpetrators are made to work together to move on. In Rwanda a deliberate effort was made to bring together victims and some perpetrators of the genocide with the hope of getting them to go over the experience and offer and accept apologies. The government also introduced laws promoting cultural and social harmony and banning deliberate demonization and the use of the kind of propaganda that caused the genocide. In Northern Ireland, after the Good Friday Agreement, tension between the Catholics and Protestants was significantly reduced through the application of EMU and CE – Education for Mutual Trust and Cultural Education. This policy provided incentives for mutual cooperation and respect – through education at early stages – which were previously non-existent. These policies are worth emulating, but should take into consideration our specific cultural values and must not be donor-prescribed.

It would be interesting to see how any candidate that forms government after May 29 would come up with his plan to defeat Boko Haram completely, not just suppress the ideology temporarily, and begin a post-conflict reconstruction process that would address all the underlying problems often cited as the real causes of the insurgency, like every serious country does. This would require unpretentious willingness and sincere openness to ideas even from political rivals as well as the readiness of the political class to set aside politics and work for the common good.

(Concluded)

Postscript:

The first part of this essay drew a number of very useful inputs, which I greatly appreciate. As a way forward next week I will, with your permission, publish these valuable contributions, which we hope would be helpful in further understanding and, ultimately, addressing radicalization and homegrown terrorism.